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JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 
the provisions of Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(e)(ii), § 63-46b-
16 (Supp. 1988), and Rule 14, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This is an appeal from the Orders of the Utah State Tax 
Commission (the "Commission"), dated March 28, 1991, which remanded 
the controversy to the Uintah County Board of Equalization for 
future proceedings; specifically, to adduce additional evidence to 
establish the fair market value of the real property which is the 
subject matter of this appeal. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Orders from which appeal is taken in this matter are based 
upon the Commission's finding that there was insufficient factual 
evidence from which the Commission could make a determination 
concerning the fair market value of the subject property. In that 
this finding is implicitly based upon the Commission expertise in 
the areas of taxation and appraisal methodology, as applied to the 
facts adduced in evidence, deference should be given to the 
Commission's ruling and the appropriate standard of review is one 
of "reasonableness and rationality". 
RELEVANT STATUTES 
Utah Constitution, Article XIII, § 2: 
(1) All tangible property in the State, 
not exempt under the laws of the United 
States, or under this Constitution, shall be 
taxed at a uniform and equal rate in propor-
tion to its value, to be ascertained as pro-
vided by law. 
Utah Constitution, Article XIII, § 3: 
(1) The Legislature shall provide by law 
a uniform and equal rate of assessment and 
taxation on all tangible property in the 
state, according to its value in money, except 
as otherwise provided in Section 2 of this 
Article. The Legislature shall prescribe by 
law such provisions as shall secure a just 
valuation for taxation of such property, so 
that every person and corporation shall pay a 
tax in proportion to the value of his, her, or 
its tangible property, provided that the 
Legislature may determine the manner and 
extent of taxing livestock. 
(2) Land used for agricultural purposes 
may, as the Legislature prescribes, be as-
sessed according to its value for agricultural 
use without regard to the value it may have 
for other purposes. 
Utah Code, § 63-46b-16(4): 
The appellate court shall grant relief 
only if, on the basis of the agency's record, 
it determines that a person seeking judicial 
review has been substantially prejudiced by 
any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or 
rule on which the agency action is based, is 
unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
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(b) the agency has acted beyond the 
jurisdiction conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of 
the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously inter-
preted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlaw-
ful procedure or decision-making process, or 
has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the person taking the agency action 
were illegally constituted as a decision-
making body or were subject to disqualifica-
tion; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a 
determination of fact, made or implied by the 
agency, that is not supported by substantial 
evidence when viewed in light of the whole 
record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion 
delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the 
agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency,s prior 
practice, unless the agency justifies the 
inconsistency by given facts and reasons that 
demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the 
inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capri-
cious • 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from Orders of the Commission, remanding the 
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underlying controversy to the Uintah Board of Equalization for 
further proceedings to adduce evidence concerning the fair market 
value of real property. The property is assessed under the 
Farmland Assessment Act ("FAA") (U.C.A. § 59-2-501, et seq.). The 
qualification of the property for assessment under the FAA is not 
at issue. The issue before this court involves appellant's 
challenge of the Commission's remand orders based upon the 
Commission's findings that (1) appellant's appraisal did not 
conform to generally accepted practices and (2) there was insuffi-
cient evidence from which the fair market value of the property 
could be ascertained. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
References to the record in this brief, paginated pursuant to 
Rule 11(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, are denoted 
"R.fl. References to the transcript of the formal hearing are 
denoted "T.ff. 
1. The tax year at issue is 1989. R. 5, Case No. 910183; R. 
5, Case No. 910185; and R. 5, Case No. 910200. The real property 
which is the subject matter of this appeal (the "subject property") 
consists of grazing land in Uintah County, Utah, owned by Utah 
Shale Land & Minerals Corp ("Utah Shale"), Uintah Oil Association 
("Uintah Oil"), and Utah Oil Shales, Inc. ("Utah Oil") (herein 
collectively referred to as "appellant"). T. 7. 
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2. The 1989 property tax was assessed by the Uintah County 
Assessor, based upon a total value of $960,026.00 on property owned 
by Utah Shale (R. 6, Case No. 910185); $101,948.00 on property 
owned by Uintah Oil (R. 6, Case No. 910183), and $113,935.00 on 
property owned by Utah Oil (R. 6, Case No. 910200). 
3. Appellant contested the value placed on the real property 
and requested assessment, based upon a total value of $75,400.00 on 
property owned by Utah Shale (R. 6, Case No. 910185); $8,100.00 on 
property owned by Uintah Oil (R. 6, Case No. 910183), and $9,000.00 
on property owned by Utah Oil (R. 6, Case No. 910200). 
4. The total value assigned by the Uintah County Assessor 
was based on $50.00 per acre, while the total value claimed by the 
appellant was based upon $4.00 per acre. R. 6, Case No. 910185; R. 
6, Case No. 910183; and R. 6, Case No. 910200. 
5. The Uintah County Board of Equalization denied appel-
lant's request for reduction in the assessed value and appellant 
appealed to the Commission. A formal hearing was held on October 
11, 1990, during which the Commission adduced evidence from the 
respective parties. R. 5, Case No. 910183; R. 5, Case No. 910185; 
and R. 5, Case No. 910200. 
6. On March 28, 1991, three separate orders were entered, 
all of which remanded the dispute to the Uintah County Board of 
Equalization for further proceedings to determine the fair market 
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value of the property. R. 9, Case No. 910183; R. 9, Case No. 
910185; and R. 9, Case No. 910200. 
7. Appeal was taken by all three taxpayers and the cases 
have been consolidated for purposes of this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant takes the position that the Commission's remand 
orders are futile and that it will serve no useful purpose for the 
Board of Equalization of Uintah County to take additional evidence. 
Appellant argues that the Commission's decision is beyond the 
limits of reason and rationality or, in the alternative, is 
arbitrary and capricious. Appellant further argues that the 
evidence presented by its expert witness was uncontroverted and the 
Commission erred in refusing to adjust the assessment based upon 
the appraisal submitted. Finally, appellant asserts that the 
Commission's remand constitutes an unconstitutional taking of 
appellant's property without due process. 
Uintah County agrees with the Commission's evaluation of the 
evidence adduced at the formal hearing. The County argues that 
appellant will not be substantially prejudiced by the remand order 
and that the Uintah County Board of Equalization has both the 
authority and the responsibility of determining the actual fair 
market value of the property as of January 1, 1989. 
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A R G U M E N T 
POINT I 
THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSION WAS NOT 
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS, IS WITHIN THE LIMITS OF 
THE REASONABLE AND RATIONAL TEST, AND SHOULD BE UPHELD 
Utah Code Annotated, § 63-46b-17 provides that final agency 
actions resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings are appealed 
immediately to Utah's appellate courts and sets forth the grounds 
upon which relief may be granted by the appellate courts of Utah. 
The standard of review applicable to final agency actions was 
discussed by this court in Hurley v. Board of Review of Indus. 
Com'n., 767 P.2d 524 (Utah 1988): 
. . . There are essentially three standards 
that determine the scope of judicial review of 
agency action. [Citations omitted.] The 
correction-of-error standard applies to agency 
rulings on issues of law and extends no defer-
ence to agency rulings. An agency's findings 
of fact, however, are accorded substantial 
deference and will not be overturned if based 
on substantial evidence, even if another 
conclusion from the evidence is permissible. 
[Footnote omitted.] As to questions of mixed 
law and fact, a reviewing court usually ac-
cords an agency decision some deference, i.e., 
an agency's decision will not be set aside 
unless the agency conclusion is unreasonable. 
767 P.2d, at 526-527. 
To prevail on appeal relative to the Commission's factual 
findings, the County must show only that the Commission's conclu-
sions were reasonable and based upon substantial evidence, even if 
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more than one conclusion from the evidence is possible. Johnson v. 
Department of Employment Security, 782 P. 2d 965, 968 (Utah App. 
1989). The party challenging an agency's factual findings "must 
marshal all of the evidence supporting the findings and show that 
despite the supporting facts, the Tax Commission's findings are not 
supported by substantial evidence." First National Bank of Boston 
v. County Board of Equalization of Salt Lake County, 799 P.2d 1165 
(Utah 1990). 
Appellant apparently misapprehends the mandate contained in 
First National Bank of Boston and has marshalled the evidence which 
supports appellant's position, arguing that evidence was sufficient 
to sustain appellant's burden of proof. The evidence supporting 
the Commission's findings is discussed below. 
A. The Commission's Finding with Respect to Market Rents is 
Supported bv Substantial Evidence. 
As noted above, appellant has, in effect, marshalled the 
evidence which supports its own position. To prevail under the 
"substantial evidence" test discussed by this court in First 
National Bank of Boston, supra. the appellant must marshall the 
evidence supporting the Commission's factual findings to establish 
that the findings are not supported by substantial evidence. The 
contrary is true. 
Edward M. Bown, testifying for appellant (T. 8), stated: 
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A The lease rentals on these lands have 
been rather nominal and we have followed 
that policy from the three companies' 
standpoint because we felt that by taking 
less rental, there would be lighter use 
of the lands, and we've tried to preserve 
and protect those forage resources by not 
requesting or seeking the highest rental 
which we maybe could have obtained during 
certain years. 
Q So, for conservation purposes, you have 
not maximized the use of it as agricul-
tural property, then? 
A No, sir, we really never have. 
In its opening brief, appellant argues that the testimony of 
its expert witness, Mr. Wiles, was uncontradicted. The contrary is 
true. Appellant's own witness, Mr. Bown, testified that the 
rentals actually charged by the taxpayers/owners were, by design, 
less than what could have been realized. 
Appellant's argument also fails to consider the testimony of 
Mr. Wiles concerning the AUM allocation. On direct examination, 
Mr. Wiles testified (T. 33): 
Q In your examination of the BLM records, 
did you find any information of the ani-
mal units per month? 
A Yes. 
Q And what was your finding? 
A They carried 5,307 AUM's allotted to the 
oil shale allotment, and that would in-
clude the fee lands, state leases and the 
BLM lands that are included in the allot-
ment. 
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Q Do you recall when that allocation had 
been made? 
A No, I do not. Within several years prior 
to • 
Q Based upon your own experience and your 
observation of the property, would you 
evaluate the BLM allocation as being 
approximately correct or high or low? 
A (Inaudible) . . . the date in the BLM and 
it appears from looking at the land con-
dition of the BLM data that the BLM's 
permit is actually close to double what 
the carrying capacity might be, 
Mr. Wiles also testified (T. 35): 
Q Were there any other documented sources 
that you also reviewed? 
A The Soil Conservation Service or produc-
tive capacities and soil map information. 
* * * 
A We reviewed the information in the state 
grazing leases as to the AUM's allotted 
to the land and the location of those 
lands. 
Q What did that tell you? 
A It basically had the same amount of AUM's 
allocated as the BLM did. 
From the testimony of appellant's expert, the Commission had 
evidence that the AUM allocation of the Soil Conservation Service, 
the state grazing leases, and the Bureau of Land Management was 
nearly twice what appellant's expert believed it should be and upon 
which, presumably, his appraisal was based. 
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B. The Commission's Determination That Appellant's Appraisal 
Lacked Significant Data Elements is Supported by the Evidence, 
Appellant argues that the appraisal submitted by its expert 
witness was sufficient to establish the value of the property and 
that no contradictory evidence was submitted. As a preliminary 
matter, it should be noted that, in making its decision, the 
Commission may "rely upon its specialized knowledge and experience 
in taxation and tax administration . . . ." Utah Administrative 
Code, R861-1-7A(L). The Commission's finding that the comparable 
sales contained in the appraisal submitted by appellant's expert 
omits important elements and contains adjustments that are 
subjective and are difficult to support with reliable market data 
is entitled to deference on review by this court. As this court 
noted in Xanthos v. Board of Adiustment of Salt Lake City, 685 P.2d 
1032 (Utah 1984): 
This Court has consistently held that: 
Due to the complexity of factors involved in 
the matter of zoning, as in other fields where 
courts review the actions of administrative 
bodies, it should be assumed that those 
charged with that responsibility (the Board) 
have specialized knowledge in that field. 
Accordingly, [administrative agencies] should 
be allowed a comparatively wide latitude of 
discretion; and their actions endowed with a 
presumption of correctness and validity which 
the courts should not interfere with unless it 
is shown that there is no reasonable basis to 
justify the action taken. 
685 P.2d, at 1034, citing Cottonwood Heights Citizen Association v. 
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Board of Commissioners. 593 P.2d 138, 140 (Utah 1979). 
Appellant urges the court to disregard the Commission's 
finding that the appraisal lacked important factors from which its 
accuracy could be ascertained and argues that the County presented 
no contrary evidence. Both parties admit that sales of comparable 
tracts of land are scarce. Appellant objected to the admission of 
documents evidencing comparable sales on the basis that the 
property could not be adequately identified. R. 63. 
Appellant's assertion in its opening brief that all parties 
agree no additional evidence is available is not entirely accurate. 
The documentary evidence which the County withdrew, after appel-
lant's objection, was withdrawn by reason of Mr. Merkley's 
representations that a degree of confidentiality would be accorded 
the evidence. On remand, the County would have an opportunity to 
seek and possibly be relieved of the confidentiality and be in a 
position to offer more substantive evidence in support of its 
valuation. So, too, would appellant be afforded the opportunity to 
revise the appraisals submitted by its expert "correct the 
deficiencies in its case and submit sufficient evidence and 
analyses for an appropriate and accurate value to be determined for 
the subject property." R. 8. 
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POINT II 
THE COMMISSION'S RULING DOES NOT VIOLATE 
PRESCRIBED PROCEDURES IN ADJUDICATORY PROCEEDINGS 
Appellant next argues that the Commission failed to follow its 
own prescribed procedures, which appellant asserts required the 
Commission to accept the evidence introduced by appellant. As 
discussed above, the evidence presented by appellant was, in some 
significant respects, contradictory. In any event, the procedure 
to which appellant refers provides, in its entirety: 
The Commission will accept uncontradicted 
evidence, unless inherently improbable, as 
being true. However, where such evidence is 
solely and exclusively in the possession of 
the one offering the same or where it would be 
impossible or extremely difficult for the 
adverse party to obtain rebuttal evidence, the 
Commission reserves the right to give such 
uncontradicted evidence only the weight deemed 
fair, just, and proper. 
Utah Administrative Code, R861-1-7A(0). 
Because the evidence adduced by appellant was, in itself, 
contradictory and in view of the acknowledged difficulty surround-
ing presentation of comparable sales data, the Commission was 
justified in according the evidence less than dispositive weight. 
POINT III 
THE COMMISSION'S RULING IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
AND DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A CONFISCATORY TAKING 
OF APPELLANT'S PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS 
Appellant's final argument is replete with speculation and 
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borders on the hysterical• Citing a number of general constitu-
tional concepts (i.e., the court has jurisdiction to grant relief 
if an agency action is unconstitutional; due process finds its 
roots in concepts of basic fairness of procedure; and all taxable 
property should bear a just proportion of the burden of taxation), 
appellant makes the incredible argument that the practical effect 
of the Commission's remand for further proceedings is a confisca-
tion of appellant's property. 
Appellant asserts that it has been denied due process in that 
the Commission's remand order sets "an impossibly high threshold 
for proof necessary to rebut the Board's valuation. The Commission 
demands evidence which, according to the testimony of both 
Petitioner and the Board, cannot be obtained." 
The reality is that the Commission's remand order specifically 
identifies the weaknesses in the presentations of both parties and 
finds that, because of those weaknesses and omissions, it simply 
has insufficient information upon which to arbitrate a determina-
tion of what the fair market value of the property is, as between 
the value urged by the County and the value claimed by appellant. 
That the Commission's ruling amounts to a deprivation of property 
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution is so incredible as to be bizarre. The argument is 
merely inflammatory and appellant cites no applicable authority in 
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support of its position. 
Appellant next argues that assessment of the property at $40 
to $53 per acre effectively confiscates property determined to be 
worth only $4.00 per acre. This argument ignores both the letter 
and the spirit of the Commission's ruling. No final determination 
of value has been made. The Commission has merely ruled that it 
has insufficient information upon which to make a determination. 
Appellant argues that, in the event the property ceases to 
qualify for taxation under the Farmland Assessment Act, payment of 
the roll-back taxes would be confiscatory. The fact is that any 
future change in the use of the property, such that the property 
would no longer qualify for assessment under the FAA, is totally 
irrelevant in the context of this appeal. 
Appellant's constitutional arguments can, at best, be 
characterized as premature. No final determination concerning the 
value of the property has been made. Appellant and the County have 
exactly the same opportunity to adduce additional evidence and 
correct deficiencies in the case presented to the Commission on 
October 11, 1990. By no stretch of the imagination can appellant 
be said to have been deprived of due process or to have been 
subjected to unfair or discriminatory treatment by reason of the 
Commission's order remanding this matter for further proceedings. 
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CONCLUSION 
Despite its extensive expertise and experience in evaluating 
appraisals and arbitrating disputes between local taxing authori-
ties and taxpayers, the Commission was unable to determine the fair 
market value of the subject property on the basis of the evidence 
adduced at the formal hearing. The Commission, therefore, 
specifically enumerated areas in the presentations of both parties 
which required further evidence and remanded the case to the Board 
of Equalization for further proceedings. 
The Commission's decision is neither arbitrary nor capricious. 
The evidence presented was contradictory and was insufficient to 
enable the Commission to make a determination concerning the value 
of the property. The Commission's ruling was both reasonable and 
rational and is supported by substantial evidence. 
Appellant has not been substantially prejudiced by the 
Commission's ruling. No final determination concerning the value 
of the subject property has been made. Appellant retains all of 
its statutory remedies and has the opportunity to develop addition-
al evidence and correct the deficiencies identified in the 
Commission's ruling in further proceedings before the Uintah County 
Board of Equalization. Further, should appellant still believe 
itself aggrieved upon conclusion of the proceedings in Uintah 
County, it may again appeal the decision to the Tax Commission. 
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Deference should be given to the Commission's factual 
findings, challenged by appellant, and the Commission's remand for 
further proceedings should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /U^~^ day of November, 1991. 
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